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 We may distinguish three styles or strategies of decisionmaking. Under a 
maximizing approach, the decisionmaker chooses the action whose consequences are best 
for the case at hand (defining “best” according to some value the decisionmaker holds). 
Where decisionmakers choose the action that is best relative to constraints, accounting 
for the direct costs and opportunity costs of decisionmaking, we may call the approach 
optimizing rather than maximizing. Whereas the maximizer focuses only on the case at 
hand, the optimizer acts so as to maximize value over an array of cases. In contrast to 
both approaches, satisficing permits any decision whose results in the case at hand are 
good enough—although we will see that satisficing, like optimizing, may itself represent 
an indirect strategy of maximization. 
In what follows, I will suggest that these distinctions illuminate legal 
interpretation. Interpretation is just another type of decisionmaking, so interpreters must 
use some decision-procedure or other. Many approaches to the interpretation of statutes 
and the Constitution are maximizing approaches that attempt to produce as much as 
possible of some value the interpreter holds—for example, fidelity to legislative intent or 
original understandings. Optimizing approaches to interpretation1 condemn maximizing 
interpretation as a simpleminded approach that neglects the costs of decisionmaking and 
the costs of interpretive error. An alternative to both maximizing and optimizing 
                                                 
*  Bernard Meltzer Professor of Law, The University of Chicago.  This paper was prepared for the 
University of San Diego Law School conference “What is Legal Interpretation?”, and is forthcoming in the 
San Diego Law Review in 2005.  Thanks to Eric Posner, Fred Schauer, and Cass Sunstein for comments, 
and to Justin Rubin for research assistance. 
1  Pioneered by Fred Schauer, among others.  See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Practice and Problems of 
Plain Meaning: A Response to Aleinikoff and Shaw, 45 VAND. L. REV. 715 (1992).  Expanding the lens to 
include the problems faced by interpreters on a multimember court, Schauer also defends an account of 
plain meaning that has satisficing overtones: interpreters might coordinate on plain meaning even though it 
is merely acceptable to each, because it can secure the agreement of all.  See Frederick Schauer, Statutory 
Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 231. 
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approaches is a satisficing style of interpretation, in which interpreters eschew the search 
for the very best interpretation (even within constraints), instead selecting an 
interpretation that is good enough, in light of whatever value theory the interpreter holds. 
The choice among decisionmaking strategies is utterly agnostic about the underlying 
value theory; whatever such theory the interpreter holds, there is always a separate 
question about which decision-procedures are best suited to promote the decisionmaker’s 
aims. 
I will criticize the maximizing style of interpretation and praise its two 
competitors. Both the optimizing and satisficing perspectives, I suggest, help in different 
ways to justify some controversial principles of statutory and constitutional 
interpretation, such as the rule barring resort to legislative history where statutes have a 
plain meaning, and clause-bound (as opposed to broadly holistic or “intratextualist”) 
interpretation of statutes and the Constitution. Although maximizing interpretation is 
untenable, neither the optimizing approach nor the satisficing approach is globally best; 
each is an attractive decision-procedure in some contexts. Where the interpretive stakes 
are either very low or very high, satisficing is reasonable (whether or not rational in some 
stronger sense), while optimizing is best suited to medium-stakes decisions. 
 I begin, in Section I, by clarifying the conceptual distinctions between and among 
maximizing, optimizing and satisficing. Section II identifies interpretive styles that draw 
upon these decisionmaking strategies, criticizes some prominent examples of maximizing 
interpretation, and examines some contested interpretive principles that the optimizing 
and satisficing perspectives might justify. Section III offers some considerations that bear 
upon the choice between optimizing and satisficing as interpretive strategies. Section IV 
considers the wide appeal of maximizing styles of interpretation, and suggests some 
mechanisms that cause maximizing interpretation to appear more attractive than it should. 
This is not an occasion for ponderous work, so my aim throughout is simply to sketch 
ideas; I make no effort at a comprehensive and detailed treatment. 
I. Maximizing, Optimizing and Satisficing 
 The standard model of rational decisionmaking defines rational choice as the 
choice that maximizes some value. In a common interpretation, the value to be 
 3
Three Strategies 
maximized is welfare, in turn defined (contentiously) as the satisfaction of subjective 
preferences. Nothing inherent in the model, however, requires this; the idea of rational 
choice deployed in decision theory is strictly formal. The decisionmaker simply ranks the 
outcomes of possible actions according to some scale of value and chooses the 
maximizing action—the action that produces the highest value. The model can be 
extended to cover situations of risk, in which the outcomes of actions are probabilistic 
rather than certain, by taking the maximand to be expected value. In situations of 
uncertainty, where not even the probabilities of various outcomes are known, one view 
suggests that decisionmakers can simply assign subjective probabilities, converting 
uncertainty back into risk; other views propose other choice criteria, such as maximin 
(maximizing the minimum payoff). The distinctions between certainty, risk and 
uncertainty are orthogonal to the issue I address here; the important point is that in all of 
these situations, the standard model defines rational choice as maximizing choice. 
 In the simplest versions of the standard model, the feasible set of actions or 
options is just given. Here the idea of satisficing is incoherent. How could it be rational, 
in a static context, to choose anything other than the best available action—to do 
anything other than maximizing? Some philosophers suggest that it can be rational to 
choose less than the best, so long as the action chosen is satisfactory.2 But if the action 
chosen is less than the best and also satisfactory, than the best action is also satisfactory, 
and satisficing gives no reason to choose the former over the latter. In static contexts, the 
superiority of maximizing to satisficing is conceptually entailed by the scale of value the 
decisionmaker uses. 
Satisficing comes into its own, however, when decisionmaking is viewed more 
dynamically.3 In many real-world decisions, the set of options is itself (at least partially) 
the product of earlier decisions. One of the most important questions decisionmakers face 
is the extent of rational search: how many options, and how much information, should be 
sought out and considered before an ultimate choice is made? Here satisficing is 
coherent; as Herbert Simon emphasized, satisficing is a constraint on further search for 
                                                 
2  MICHAEL SLOTE, BEYOND OPTIMIZING (1989). 
3  See Michael Byron, Satisficing and Optimality, 109 ETHICS 67 (1998). 
 4
Three Strategies 
new information and new options.4 The satisficer searches only until finding a choice 
whose outcomes are good enough. By satisficing with respect to the particular decision at 
hand, the satisficer conserves time and other resources that may then be expended on 
other decisions. 
In dynamic settings, optimizing is also best understood as a constraint on further 
search for new options or new information. Maximizing always takes place within budget 
constraints, especially time. To maximize in the simpleminded sense of searching until 
one finds the very best option in the case at hand, all things considered, is to neglect the 
opportunity costs of search. (Although simpleminded maximizing in the case at hand is 
indefensible, I will also claim below that it is a common approach to interpretive 
decisionmaking). The antonym of satisficing, on this view, is not simpleminded 
maximizing. Rather it is optimizing, by which we denote maximization that takes into 
account constraints, such as the cost of searching for further information and options. The 
optimizer searches until the costs of further search equal or exceed the expected benefits 
of additional information, or of new options. 
In what follows, then, I shall contrast three different decisionmaking strategies: 
maximizing, taken to mean a simpleminded effort to find the very best choice, all things 
considered, in the particular decisionmaking context at hand;5 optimizing, or 
maximization that takes into account the direct costs and opportunity costs of acquiring 
information and making decisions; and satisficing. Optimizing and satisficing are 
different ways of pursuing the same larger aim. Both strategies rest on an implicit 
recognition that to do what is best, all things considered, with respect to some particular 
decision in an array of decisions is to do something that may not be globally best, or best 
from some larger perspective. Both strategies, in other words, are second-order 
maximizing6: to maximize globally, the decisionmaker may do best to choose in a way 
that is less than maximally best with respect to the local decision at hand. 
                                                 
4 See Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 
99 (1955); HERBERT A. SIMON, REASON IN HUMAN AFFAIRS 85 (1983). 
5 An accessible critique of maximizing is Barry Schwartz, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE: WHY MORE IS LESS 
(2004), although Schwartz does not clearly distinguish optimizing from satisficing. 
6  Cass R. Sunstein and Edna Ullmann-Margalit, Second-Order Decisions, 110 ETHICS 5 (1999). 
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It is important to be clear, however, that optimizing and satisficing are different 
second-order decision strategies. The two strategies employ different stopping rules, or 
rules for constraining further search among possible options. The optimizer stops 
searching when the marginal benefit of finding a better option, discounted by the 
probability of finding such an option, is equal to or less than the costs of further search. 
The satisficer stops searching when she finds an option that is good enough. Although the 
two strategies sometimes yield similar choices, sometimes they do not,7 and even if they 
were extensionally equivalent, the two strategies would still embody different rules for 
choosing. 
As the reference to stopping rules suggests, the jurisprudential distinction between 
rules and standards is relevant here. Maximizing is the ultimate standard: the maximizer 
does what is best, all things considered, taking into account the totality of the 
circumstances relevant to the local decision at hand. Optimizing and satisficing strategies 
both appeal to the higher-order virtues of rules, to the idea that a decisionmaker who 
takes into account less than the full set of considerations that bear on a particular decision 
may for a range of reasons do better, over a whole array of decisions, than does the 
simpleminded maximizer.8 Yet this conceptual point about the possible virtues of rules 
does not purport to specify the content of the rules. Optimizing and satisficing strategies 
are different stopping rules that use different means to their common aim of global 
maximization. “An optimizing strategy places limits on how much we are willing to 
invest in seeking alternatives. A satisficing strategy places limits on how much we insist 
on finding before we quit that search and turn our attention to other matters.”9 
Here is an illustration of the three strategies.10 Three decision theorists—M,O and 
S—enter the main university cafeteria, which holds no less than twenty separate stations, 
each of which offers a different type of cuisine. M is a simpleminded maximizer who 
seeks the most satisfying possible meal right now; M spends the next hour visiting each 
                                                 
7  See Jonathan Bendor and Sunil Kumar, Satisficing and Optimality, (unpublished manuscript on file with 
the author). 
8  FRED SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED 
DECISIONMAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 12-15 (1991). 
9  David Schmidtz, Satisficing as a Humanly Rational Strategy, in SATISFICING AND MAXIMIZING: MORAL 
THEORIST AND PRACTICAL REASON 35 (Michael Byron ed., 2004). 
10  Adapted from Schmidtz, id.    
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station, pondering possible choices, and so on. (By the time M is done choosing his meal, 
O and S have finished eating and are back in their offices working on papers). O is a 
second-order maximizer, who sees that maximizing her satisfaction from this particular 
meal is suboptimal from a overall perspective. O thus adopts a stopping rule that is 
calculated to optimize her satisfaction, taking into account decision costs and opportunity 
costs. Calculating the marginal costs and benefits, O decides to visit five randomly-
selected stations out of the possible twenty, and then to choose from within this set the 
station whose offering maximizes the satisfaction of O’s tastes. S is also a second-order 
maximizer, but she employs a different stopping rule: S proceeds along the stations until 
he finds an offering that is good enough, and then stops searching. Although O and S may 
happen to light upon the same offering, there is no guarantee that they will do so; and 
although it is true that both O and S manage to avoid the plight of the obsessive and self-
defeating M, they have used different strategies to that end. 
Of course no maximizer really considers all things. M will eventually choose a 
meal, rather then spending an infinite amount of time evaluating micro-features of the 
alternatives. Yet M may spend far more time and effort on this local choice than would 
be justified from a second-order, globally maximizing perspective. Although the local 
maximizer will stop at some point, that point may lie far beyond the local optimum, as 
identified from the global point of view.11  
II. Decisionmaking and Interpretation 
 What does all this have to do with interpretation? Many debates over interpretive 
practices are debates over the decision procedures interpreters should use. These debates 
include important questions about how much information interpreters should collect, 
what set of possible interpretations to consider, and what stopping rules they should use 
as constraints on further search for information. Examining the history and theory of 
statutory and constitutional interpretation in America, we can identify interpretive styles 
that correspond to, and implicitly draw upon, the decisionmaking strategies we have 
identified. 
                                                 
11  See Schwartz, supra, for examples of pathological maximizing in daily life.  
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 Rather than pursue this theme in the abstract, I will proceed by demonstration, 
examining just two of the many settings in which the contrast among these interpretive 
strategies shows plainly. The first involves the debate over legislative history and the 
plain meaning rule; the second involves the debate, in both statutory and constitutional 
arenas, over the weight to be accorded to statutory or constitutional clauses other than the 
clauses directly at issue—including, in the statutory setting, the question how much 
attention courts should pay to statutes in pari materia. 
Legislative history and the plain meaning rule 
Suppose interpreters are intentionalists: they subscribe to some high-level 
political theory, perhaps an account of representative democracy, according to which 
legislators’ intentions make the law. Intentionalism thus supplies the value theory that 
defines what counts as a good or bad interpretation: a good interpretation is one that 
captures legislators’ intentions. Suppose also that this scale of value is continuous: 
interpretations may capture more or less of the legislators’ true intentions, and the more 
the better.  
 Maximizing. In light of this value theory, the intentionalist interpreter who is also 
a simpleminded maximizer will proceed to search as widely as possible for information 
about legislators’ intentions in the case at hand. On this view, interpreters may begin by 
consulting statutory text for evidence of legislative intent. But there is nothing special 
about text; interpreters will range beyond the statute to consult legislative history, 
previous and subsequent statutes, perhaps even in-court testimony from the statute’s 
drafters.12 This expansive search for further information about legislators’ intentions 
follows from the assumption that “there is no invariable rule for the discovery of 
legislative intention”;13 any source is in principle admissible, and should be given 
whatever probative weight it intrinsically deserves. 
 Despite its intuitive appeal, simplemindedly maximizing intentionalism of this 
sort is exposed to serious objections. It neglects the direct costs and opportunity costs of 
                                                 
12  See Campbell v. Board of Dental Examiners, 52 Cal. App. 3d 283, 286 n. 3 (1975) (allowing testimony 
by the statute’s drafter because “it constitutes some indication at least of the probable intent of the 
Legislature”). 
13  United States v. American Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 542-44 (1940). 
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searching further and further afield for evidence of legislative intentions. We may sort 
these costs into two rough categories, decision costs and error costs. Holding constant the 
accuracy of decisions, simplemindedly maximizing intentionalism produces wasted effort 
(from an ex post standpoint) whenever the interpretation the court ultimately settles upon, 
after extensive review of collateral sources, is the same interpretation it would have 
reached with a more restricted set of sources. Holding the costs of decision constant, 
searching further and further afield might even reduce accuracy even in the decision at 
hand, if maximizers with constrained cognitive and information-processing capacities 
become bewildered by a large set of conflicting evidence. Furthermore, decision costs 
and accuracy interact over the whole array of cases. Even if collecting more and more 
evidence of legislative intentions in Case 1 increases accuracy in that case, the 
opportunity cost of search means that the intentionalist interpreter will have less time to 
spend on Case 2 than she would if decisionmaking resources were distributed more 
evenly over cases—which means that the interpreter will tend to perform less accurately 
in Case 2. 
 Optimizing. An important alternative to simplemindedly maximizing 
intentionalism, then, is optimizing intentionalism, which constrains the search for 
evidence of legislators’ intentions by reference to a larger cost-benefit calculus. The 
optimizing intentionalist employs a stopping rule: she declines to search further afield if 
the expected benefits of further search are less than the costs, including among the latter 
both the decision costs of search and the chance that new sources will reduce accuracy by 
driving a fallible interpreter off a correct interpretation that a smaller set of sources would 
have suggested. This description of the optimizing intentionalist calculus is abstract. We 
have sketched the variables the optimizing intentionalist takes into account, but the 
specific decision-rules that result depend on what values those variables actually take—
an empirical issue. My point here is just that, given certain values of the relevant 
variables, the notion of an optimizing-intentionalist stopping rule provides a justification 
for considering less than all probative information bearing on legislative intentions in 
particular cases—even for interpreters fully committed to intentionalism as a high-level 
account of statutes’ authority. 
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For a concrete example, we might consider something like the version of 
intentionalism embodied in the “plain meaning rule.” Under that rule, legislative intent is 
the ultimate object of interpretation, but clear statutory text is conclusive evidence of 
legislative intent. The plain meaning rule is a stopping rule: the interpreter stops 
searching for further evidence of legislative intentions when the statutory text is clear. 
Further search, say into legislative history, is permissible only when the statutory text is 
ambiguous or otherwise lacks a plain meaning. 
Thus in Caminetti v. United States14 the Court affirmed a conviction under the 
White Slave Traffic Act of a man who had transported a woman across state lines to 
become his mistress, reasoning that the statute's prohibition of interstate transportation 
for any "immoral purpose" was so plain as to obviate the need for any recourse to 
legislative history--even though that history, according to the dissenters, showed that the 
intent of the prohibition was to criminalize only prostitution or other commercialized 
immorality.15 Although the Court conceded that legislative history "may aid the courts in 
reaching the true meaning of the legislature in cases of doubtful interpretation," it held 
that "the language being plain, it is the sole evidence of the ultimate legislative intent." 
 Nothing in the optimizing-intentionalist view of Caminetti, and the plain meaning 
rule, excludes or needs to exclude the possibility that the dissenters in Caminetti were 
correct. Perhaps the plain meaning did not actually track legislators’ intentions, and the 
legislative history would have revealed them. From the second-order standpoint of the 
optimizing decisionmaker, this is just to repeat the point that the plain meaning rule 
tolerates results that are suboptimal or erroneous in the decision at hand, all things 
considered, for the sake of better results over an array of interpretive decisions.16 
This tradeoff can, under certain circumstances, be beneficial on net. Suppose that 
plain statutory text is usually excellent evidence of legislative intent, and that going 
beyond statutory text into voluminous and complex legislative history often produces 
high decision costs and opportunity costs. Given finite time and decisionmaking capacity, 
and an array of future cases that must be decided, the interpreter may do better overall by 
                                                 
14 242 U.S. 470 (1917). 
15 See id. at 496-502 (McKenna, J., dissenting). 
16  This is the thrust of Schauer, supra note 1. 
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allocating less effort to discerning legislative intentions in the particular case at hand, 
while allocating more effort to other cases in the array. Moreover, simpleminded 
maximizing past the optimum point may produce little improvement in accuracy even in 
the very case at hand. It is quite possible that simpleminded intentionalist maximizing in 
a given case will reduce accuracy, even in that very case, if cognitively fallible 
interpreters are confused or led astray by legislative history that drives them off the 
correct interpretation that plain statutory text would otherwise indicate. For any of these 
reasons, simplemindedly maximizing intentionalism will do worse, from a higher-order 
perspective, than optimizing intentionalism that employs a stopping rule. Again, I do not 
argue here that the plain meaning rule is indeed the best stopping rule for intentionalists; 
to know that, we would have to know more than we currently do. I only mean to indicate 
a type of justification for the plain meaning rule that is invisible to the maximizing 
interpreter. 
 Satisficing. A different stopping rule for intentionalist interpreters would be to 
search until, but only until, an interpretation turns up that is satisfactory. The optimizing 
intentionalist, in a case like Caminetti, proceeds on the basis of a rule that is calculated to 
produce the best possible interpretation given the resource constraints, including limited 
time and limited cognitive capacity, under which the interpreter labors. The satisficing 
intentionalist employs a different approach. Rather than searching for the best possible 
interpretation, even under constraints, the satisficer sets a limit to search by accepting the 
first interpretation that is good enough. 
A satisficing interpreter might come to the same result as did the Caminetti court, 
not on the ground that the costs of further search for evidence of legislative intentions 
would be greater than the expected benefits, but simply on the ground that the plain 
meaning of the text provided an account of legislators’ intentions that was internally 
consistent, intuitively plausible, and in that sense good enough. The idea animating this 
relaxed attitude is that a maximizing search for the very best account of legislators’ 
intentions would be a sort of local perfectionism; and local perfectionism would make the 
interpretive system worse off, from a higher-order point of view. As with optimizing, 
satisficing intentionalism may produce a better allocation of time and effort across a 
whole array of cases than does simpleminded maximizing in each particular case. As 
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compared to the optimizer, the satisficer uses a different decision rule to produce the 
globally-maximizing allocation, but the aim of global maximization is the same. 
 An interesting implication of the satisficing account is that the interpretation the 
court produces is sensitive to the order in which materials are considered. In our cafeteria 
example, which offering the satisficing consumer ends up choosing depends upon which 
end of the cafeteria she starts from (assuming there are satisfactory offerings at various 
points in the line). In Caminetti, a court that (1) employed a satisficing stopping rule but 
that (2) considered legislative history before statutory text would conclude that the 
legislative history offered a fully satisfactory account of legislators’ intentions. The bare 
idea of satisficing, by itself, cannot justify a rule that intentionalist interpreters should 
stop with the plain (and satisfactory) meaning of the text, as opposed to the plain (and 
satisfactory) meaning of the legislative history. But this is no serious objection to the 
satisficer. In any decisionmaking setting in which less than all possible alternatives are to 
be searched out and considered, one must begin somewhere. The satisficing interpreter 
will satisfice at this higher level also, accepting any starting point that is good enough. 
The starting point will thus be set by convention, within any particular legal 
system. In our legal system, the convention is that statutory text is the starting point, and 
intentionalist stopping rules constrain the search for evidence beyond the text. The 
convention might be otherwise, as far as the satisficing perspective goes, but it actually 
isn’t otherwise. The satisficing judge in our legal system has no reason to lose sleep over 
what satisficing interpreters might do in other, possibly counterfactual legal systems. 
 The allure of maximizing intentionalism. A simple idea, which seems intuitive to 
many, is that the intentionalist interpreter should consider all relevant and probative 
evidence of legislative intentions in the case at hand. To deny this is to lose the rhetorical 
high ground (a point to which I return in Section IV): the maximizing intentionalist can 
always lampoon the optimizing or satisficing intentionalist by pointing to some particular 
case in which an optimizing or satisficing stopping rule would cause the interpreters to 
miss out on highly probative evidence of intentions. On either the optimizing or 
satisficing perspectives, however, this sort of argument is a simpleminded mistake, if it 
 12
Three Strategies 
counsels neglect of the costs of decisionmaking and the risks of error (the optimizer’s 
worry) and neglect of the perils of local perfectionism (the satisficer’s worry). 
If simpleminded maximizing intentionalism is mistaken, it is also a prominent and 
often dominant strand in American legal interpretation. Consider the famous Holy Trinity 
case, in which the Court without much ado discarded the traditional rule against 
consulting internal committee reports as evidence of legislative intentions.17 The Court 
said very little to justify this crucial methodological move, but it might have seemed the 
most natural thing in the world. After all, a famous intentionalist injunction held that 
“where the mind labours to discover the design of the legislature, it seizes everything 
from which aid can be derived.”18 The pre-Holy Trinity court had combined this rule with 
a rule barring judicial consideration of internal legislative evidence;19 to the Holy Trinity 
court, this must have seemed an odd, even incoherent combination, akin to telling a jury 
to “consider all relevant evidence” while excluding the smoking gun the police seized 
from the defendant. 
In both the exclusionary-rule setting and the interpretive setting, however, it is 
familiar that there may be good higher-order reasons to adopt seemingly conflicted rule-
combinations of this sort. What I add here is a taxonomy of, and contrast between, two 
different interpretive decision strategies grounded in higher-order considerations. Those 
strategies have a common enemy or antonym, however; both are alternatives to the sort 
of simpleminded maximizing intentionalism that has been so prominent in the history of 
American interpretive theory and practice. 
Clause-bound texualism and holistic textualism 
 The previous example assumed an intentionalist account of interpretation. Here I 
offer an example premised on a strictly textualist account of interpretation, to show that 
textualist interpreters also face the choice among maximizing, optimizing and satisficing 
styles of interpretation. The choice among decisionmaking strategies, I have suggested, is 
entirely agnostic as among various value theories different interpreters might hold; 
                                                 
17  To be sure, the rule had been quietly breached in a few earlier opinions.  See Adrian Vermeule, 50 STAN. 
L. REV. 1883, 1836-36 nn. 11-15 (1998). 
18  United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 386, 2 L.Ed. 304 (1805). 
19  Aldridge v. Williams, 44 U.S. 9, 24 (1845). 
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textualists as well as intentionalists must pursue their aims by means of some decision-
procedure. 
 Suppose an interpreter believes that the aim of interpretation is to capture the 
ordinary meaning of statutory or constitutional text, quite apart from anyone’s intentions. 
(I bracket here, as irrelevant for our purposes, the possible justifications for this view). 
The textualist interpreter faces a range of implementation issues that must be confronted 
to make her high-level commitment operational. How exactly should the textualist view 
be embodied in decision-procedures that interpreters will use? Of these implementation 
questions, I consider only the following: How much text should the interpreter consider? 
Suppose there is both a primary text, a statutory section or constitutional clause whose 
interpretation will settle the rule of law that applies between the parties, and collateral 
texts, such as other provisions of the Constitution or of the relevant statute, or other 
statutes. How widely should the textualist interpreter cast her net, and how much weight 
should be given to collateral texts? 
This issue underlies important debates in both statutory and constitutional 
interpretation. In the statutory arena, the Court has at times adopted a strong presumption 
of textual coherence across whole statutes, on the view that textual similarities and 
differences across provisions are at least presumptively significant. Justice Scalia’s 
opinion for the Court in West Virginia University Hospitals v. Casey20 goes even further, 
suggesting that interpreters should treat the whole U.S. Code as though terms are used 
consistently across statutes. In constitutional interpretation, Akhil Amar defends an 
“intratextualist” view that makes extensive use of comparisons across clauses, even to the 
point of insisting that words appearing in widely separated contexts be given similar 
meanings.21 Elsewhere in the constitutional arena, there are occasional hints of an even 
more expansive “intertextualist” view, analogous to the Casey opinion; on this view, the 
Constitution would be read in light of collateral legal texts, such as the Declaration of 
Independence and the Northwest Ordinance.22 What these views have in common is a 
                                                 
20  499 U.S. 83 (1991). 
21  See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747 (1999). 
22  See McConnell v. Federal Election Com’n, 124 S. Ct. 619, 724 (2003)(Scalia, J., concurring and 
dissenting)(saying that  the Declaration of Independence’s statement pledging support for the Declaration 
through the signers’ “fortune” is proof that pooling money for expressive purposes is a form of free 
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(more or less expansive) commitment to holistic or coherent textualism,23 as opposed to 
the sort of clause-bound textualism that focuses principally or solely on the statutory or 
constitutional provisions directly applicable in the case at hand. 
Maximizing. The textualist interpreter who is also a simpleminded maximizer 
seeks the ordinary meaning of a legal term in the provision at hand. Other provisions of 
the same text, or other legal texts, use the same term or use different terms in ways that 
illuminate by contrast. The simplemindedly maximizing textualist reasons that 
interpreters should consult collateral texts as widely as possible, and give them whatever 
weight they intrinsically deserve, all things considered, to whatever extent they happen to 
provide relevant evidence of ordinary meaning. Indeed, on this construal there is nothing 
at all special about legal texts; any sources of ordinary meaning will do, such as 
dictionaries, literature or the testimony of linguists. The reductio ad nauseam of the 
search for ordinary meaning is not Casey. It is the debate in Muscarello v. United States24 
over the meaning of the statutory term “carry,” as in “carry a firearm.” The case 
occasioned heated subsidiary debates over usage in the Bible, Melville, Defoe and 
M*A*S*H, and saw Justice Breyer (or his clerks) attempt to discern ordinary meaning by 
collecting examples from a database of national newspapers and then “randomly” 
sampling the results—a procedure that fails to account for selection bias in the database 
itself, akin to taping speeches at a convention of spit-and-polish grammarians and then 
“randomly” sampling the results to see whether it is ordinary usage to split infinitives. 
Optimizing and satisficing. Simplemindedly maximizing textualism fails on the 
same grounds that condemn simplemindedly maximizing intentionalism. The key points 
are familiar. First, holding constant the quality of decisions (from a textualist 
perspective), the direct decision costs and opportunity costs of holistic textualism are real, 
and perhaps quite high. The refined and comprehensive comparisons required by 
                                                                                                                                                 
speech);  City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 554 (1997)(O’Connor, J. dissenting)(saying the language 
of the Northwest Ordinance supports a reading of the “free exercise” right that includes the 
“accommodation of religious practice”). 
23  The most ambitious version of holism or coherentism is Ronald Dworkin’s idea of law as “integrity,” on 
which the whole corpus of law is to be read in a coherent fashion.  See Ronald Dworkin, LAW’S EMPIRE 
(1986).  I have confined the discussion here to holistic textualism, and Dworkin is not a textualist (at least 
in any ordinary sense of that term).  The critique of holistic maximizing, however, could also be applied to 
Dworkin, with suitable modifications.  
24  524 U.S. 125 (1911). 
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maximizing textualism take time. The time spent searching out and comparing usage 
across the whole Code, or within a database, means less time to be spent on refined 
textualism in other cases. Second, holding the costs of decisionmaking constant holistic 
textualism may do worse even according to the very value theory presupposed by 
maximizing textualism itself. As compared to clause-bound textualism, holistic or 
expansive textualism requires a more complicated and information-intensive inquiry, one 
that will reduce decisional accuracy whenever fallible interpreters read the comparison 
texts mistakenly. There is no particular reason to think that the illuminating effect of 
holistic texualism will predominate over its error-producing effect. Third, and related to 
the last, holistic textualism in the hands of fallible interpreters risks producing a holistic, 
highly coherent, but fundamentally mistaken analysis, one that enforces a simultaneous 
misreading of a whole set of related provisions. Risk-averse interpreters might prefer the 
limited incoherence of clause-bound interpretation to a sweeping, integrated, but 
erroneous universal account. 
In light of these considerations, both optimizers and satisficers will hold that 
textualists need a stopping rule that constrains the ever-expanding search for evidence of 
ordinary meaning. A consequence of this is the standard tradeoff of local inferiority for 
global superiority. Optimizing textualists and satisficing textualists will both be willing to 
render interpretations in particular cases that are inferior from a textualist standpoint to 
those that an infallible maximizing textualist would render. The hope, for both optimizers 
and satisficers, is that local inferiority will prove globally superior across a set of 
decisions—again, superior on the same value theory that the locally-maximizing 
textualist holds. 
But optimizers and satisficers will employ different stopping rules to promote 
their common aim of superior performance from a global perspective. The optimizing 
textualist attempts to calculate the point at which the expected marginal benefit of further 
evidence of textual meaning is equal to or less than the expected marginal cost, and stops 
there. The satisficing textualist stops when the text(s) she has examined point to an 
ordinary meaning that seems satisfactory—one that is plausible to her, in light of her 
native linguistic competence, that suggests a rational legislative policy, and so forth. 
Perhaps a database search, or a deep understanding of Melville, would make the meaning 
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on which the satisficing interpreter has alighted seem less satisfactory than it currently 
does. But the satisficer refuses to lose sleep over that possibility, not because she 
anticipates that the costs of further search equal or exceed the expected benefits, but 
because she believes that the perfectionist search for the very best local interpretation is 
often a self-defeating enterprise, from a global perspective. She believes that yielding to 
the siren song of local perfectionism will make her performance worse, overall, than does 
her resolute (even phlegmatic) disposition to take the good in preference to searching for 
the best. 
As usual, the two stopping rules might happen to converge to similar results. An 
opinion that both optimizing textualists and satisficing textualists might love is Dewsnup 
v. Timm, in which the Court interpreted the phrase “allowed secured claim” in §506(d) of 
the Bankruptcy Code while ignoring holistic arguments that the phrase “allowed secured 
claim” in §506(a) of the Bankruptcy Code might have something to do with the 
matter25—adopting instead what Justices Scalia and Souter, in dissent, derided as a “one-
subsection-at-a-time approach to statutory exegesis.”26 To the intentionalist or textualist 
maximizer, opinions like Dewsnup seem foolishly narrow. Why not consider an 
obviously relevant collateral provision when interpreting the provision at hand? To the 
optimizer or the satisficer, however, stopping with §506(d) might be a good idea, either 
because fathoming the complexities of §506(a) is itself a daunting task for generalist 
interpreters (so daunting that the costs of a wider inquiry outrun the expected benefits), or 
because the Court’s straightforward interpretation of §506(d) was itself a satisfactory 
local solution. 
Before we leave these examples, a general caution is in order. It has not been my 
enterprise here to defend, substantively, any particular interpretive decision-procedures or 
results. Whether the optimizer or satisficer should actually defend an opinion like 
Dewsnup will depend on the precise shape of the cost-benefit curves (to the optimizer) or 
the level of judicial aspiration (to the satisficer).27 I merely aim to illustrate two 
justifications for using truncated interpretive decision-procedures, justifications that must 
                                                 
25  See Dewnsup V. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 417 & n. 3 (1992). 
26  Id. at 423. 
27  For a sophisticated critique of Dewsnup, see Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Boyd’s Legacy 
and Blackstone’s Ghost, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 393, 421-25. 
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forever remain invisible to the maximizing interpreter. Nor do I mean to express any 
view about which interpretive strategy it would be best for judges in particular to use. A 
general issue is that suitable interpretive decision-procedures will vary with the 
institutional capacities of different interpreters occupying different roles, and with regard 
to the systemic interactions of different institutions.28 I confine myself here to mapping 
the conceptual terrain; choosing interpretive decision-procedures for particular 
interpreters turns on empirical questions, about institutional capacities and systemic 
effects, that I do not address.   
III. Optimizing or Satisficing? 
 If simpleminded local maximizing is an untenable interpretive posture, which 
stopping rule should interpreters use? Proponents of optimizing, on the one hand, and 
satisficing, on the other, have each offered generic arguments that seek to knock out the 
rival stopping rule, leaving their preferred rule in sole possession of the field, as the only 
valid alternative to simpleminded maximizing. Here I offer some brief remarks on these 
generic arguments, only to suggest that they fail. There is no knockout argument against 
either optimizing or satisficing as decisionmaking strategies in the service of global 
goals. The right assessment is more catholic: both strategies have virtues and vices that 
vary across contexts, and the two strategies can often be usefully combined. In general, 
and thus in the interpretive setting as well, optimizers and satisficers can join forces to 
reject simplemindedly maximizing interpretation without having to stage a second-round 
runoff to choose a single winner. The choice between optimizing and satisficing will turn 
on particular features of the decisionmaking context, especially the nature and size of the 
stakes. 
 Proponents of satisficing tax optimizing with a problem of infinite regress. 
Optimizers stop searching for better alternatives, including better interpretations, when 
the costs of further search exceed the expected gain in new information (about legislative 
intentions, ordinary meaning, and so on). Yet information is a good with unusual 
properties. One cannot know what the value of new information will be until one has it. 
“To maximize subject to the constraint of information cost one would have to know the 
                                                 
28  See Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 NYU L. REV. 74 (2000); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian 
Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885 (2003). 
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expected value of information, but this is not in general possible.”29 On this view, 
satisficing is the only alternative to simpleminded maximizing, because optimizing under 
conditions of limited information is a contradiction in terms. 
The infinite-regress problem, however, is best understood as a contextual caution 
rather than a foundational difficulty.30 In some settings, especially when making a string 
of similar decisions, decisionmakers can confidently expect that the next bit of 
information to turn up will be of limited value, even if they do not know what that 
information will be. Searching a very large database of employment opportunities, I 
might rationally calculate that the costs of further search exceed the benefits. Even if I 
cannot know what the next opportunity I turn up will be—perhaps it is something far 
superior to any of the ones I have seen so far—I can rationally assess the chances of its 
being superior, because I have observed a long series of similar entries, know something 
about how the database was compiled, and thus have no good reason to expect anything 
different in the future. Experience supplies prior probabilities from which decisionmakers 
can generate rational expectations about the benefits of future information. 
In the interpretive setting, interpreters or other interpreters can draw upon prior 
experience to form rational assessments of the value of the next bit of information about, 
say, legislative intentions, even if they do not know the content of that information. Much 
will depend upon the conditions under which optimizing is deployed. Some interpretive 
decisions are of a sort that are repeated frequently, some are not. Where experience 
suggests that new options or new information can be expected to differ somewhat but not 
radically from previous options or information, so that the expected value of further 
search is predictably a medium-sized quantity that can be meaningfully compared to the 
costs of further search, it would be hard to deny that optimizing interpretation is possible. 
So the argument from infinite regress cannot knock optimizing out of the ring. Is 
there a general argument against satisficing? The most common criticism is that 
satisficing is arbitrary, because the bare idea of satisficing says nothing about where 
exactly the satisficer’s aspiration level should be set. Why should interpreters be satisfied 
                                                 
29  Jon Elster, Introduction, in RATIONAL CHOICE 25 (1986). 
30  For a different line of response to the infinite-regress argument, see Holly Smith, Deciding how to 
Decide, in FOUNDATIONS OF DECISION THEORY 194 (Michael Bacharach and Susan Hurley eds., 1991). 
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with this much rather than that much evidence of legislative intentions, or ordinary 
meaning? Again, however, the force of this point varies across settings. Aspiration levels 
need not be exogenously fixed once and for all; they can be endogenously formed, as 
decisionmakers acquire experience with the relevant settings. In many domains, 
experience will suggest that the band within which an aspiration level might plausibly be 
set will be quite narrow. In the cafeteria example, no one would continue the search until 
a gourmet meal turns up, simply because it is quite predictable that no such meal will 
ever turn up; the context will not support any such aspiration. Although such practical 
considerations are not conceptually satisfying, it is not clear that satisficing rules 
themselves have or need have any aspiration to be conceptually satisfying. So long as 
they fulfill their primary mission of truncating local search at a point that is globally 
maximizing, they are good enough. 
These mutual criticisms by optimizers and satisficers point to a commonsensical 
conclusion. Neither optimizing nor satisficing is universally or acontextually best; the 
choice between stopping rules will and should vary as the features of the interpretive 
setting vary. A large challenge, one I cannot take on here, would be to delineate the 
conditions under which one stopping rule or the other is superior. As a preliminary 
matter, however, a useful idea is to focus on the size of the stakes at hand in the decision. 
On one hand, with very low-stakes decisions, satisficing appears most attractive, relative 
to optimizing. “The less we care about the gap between satisfactory and optimal 
toothpaste, for example, the more reason we have to satisfice—to look for a satisfactory 
brand and then stop searching when we find it.”31 On the other hand, where the stakes are 
very high, especially where decisions involve a choice between seemingly 
incommensurable values or life plans, satisficing also appears useful, perhaps inevitable. 
In the choice whether to become a doctor or a soldier, it is quite unclear what it would 
mean to collect an optimal amount of information before making a decision, and the best 
we can hope for is to make a satisfactory choice.32 On this view, optimizing makes most 
sense for decisions with medium-sized stakes.33 In those settings, the expected benefit of 
                                                 
31  Schmidtz, supra note 8, at 36 
32  See Elster, supra note 26, at 19-20.  
33  See Edna Ullmann-Margalit, Opting: The Case of Big Decisions, YEARBOOK OF THE 
WISSENSCHAFTSKOLLEG ZU BERLIN (1984) 441-454. 
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collecting more information or generating new options is appreciable but also limited, 
and thus meaningfully comparable to the costs of further search. 
Many interpretive decisions are plausibly medium-stakes problems, in which any 
of the possible interpretations will be consequential for the legal system but none will be 
of overwhelming importance. An even larger fraction of interpretive decisions, however, 
are the law’s equivalent of picking toothpaste in a store,34 at least from the interpreter’s 
point of view. These are cases important to the parties at hand, but with few broader 
consequences for other cases, actors or problems. Such cases probably dominate in the 
interpretive work of administrative agencies and lower courts; some might claim that they 
are not uncommon on the Supreme Court’s docket. To move beyond the conceptual 
mapping of interpretive strategies I offer here, we would need to think about which 
interpretive strategies might be best at different levels of the legal system, when used by 
different interpreters with distinct roles and institutional capacities. We might find, for 
example, that satisficing is best for interpreters in the low-stakes settings that 
predominate in the ordinary work of law, while interpreters working in more 
consequential settings might do better to optimize. Here I merely indicate the importance 
of these institutional questions, without offering answers to them. 
IV. The Prevalence of Maximizing: Some Mechanisms 
 I have criticized maximizing interpretation and offered qualified praise, varying 
across contexts, for the optimizing and satisficing alternatives. But if maximizing 
interpretation is so simpleminded, why does it have so many defenders—both on the 
bench and in the academy? Here I will survey some mechanisms that tend to push 
interpreters past the point at which optimizers or satisficers will abandon the hope of 
local perfection and cut off the search for further evidence. 
Self-interested motivation. For Bentham, the mechanism was obvious: self-
interested collusive behavior on the part of judges, lawyers and other legal actors. 
Maximizing interpretation is, above all, complex interpretation. The simplemindedly 
maximizing local interpreter is far more likely to take into account a rich and complex 
array of considerations, sources and evidence bearing on the interpretive problem at hand, 
                                                 




whereas. For Bentham, complexity was the fruit of conspiracy. Judge & Co. benefit 
jointly and severally from a highly complex, even mysterious legal system in which 
laypeople must pay rents to lawyers to steer through the thickets that the lawyers 
themselves have created.35 Although the claim rests on far too simpleminded an account 
of the motivations of lawyers and judges, it had better institutional foundations when 
Bentham wrote; consider that judges were commonly paid from the fees of litigants, and 
that one of Bentham’s principal reforms was to urge that judges be put on regular 
government salaries. 
 Cost-externalization. Peter Schuck puts Bentham’s argument in more modern 
terms, and less conspiratorial ones, by observing that the costs and benefits of complex 
legal interpretation are unequally distributed over different actors and groups.36 If 
maximizing interpretation is complex interpretation, as I have claimed, then Schuck’s 
argument also suggests that maximizing interpreters may push the search for evidence 
beyond the bounds that would limit an optimizing or satisficing interpreter, just because 
maximizing interpreters do not themselves internalize all the costs—including 
opportunity costs and decision costs—of maximizing interpretation. Consider a possible 
claim that maximizing intentionalism, with its exhaustive search through legislative 
history and other sources, is feasible for judges only because many of the resulting 
decision costs are externalized onto litigants and other legal actors. 
 Neglect of opportunity costs. Bentham’s account, as updated by Schuck, points to 
self-interested motivations on the part of lawyers, judges and other legal actors. But there 
is a cognitive mechanism operating as well, one that plausibly affects even public-spirited 
actors. I refer to the neglect of opportunity costs, relative to more visible direct costs. 
Neglect of opportunity costs tends to make decisionmaking excessively intensive and 
complex, in the maximizing style, rather than brisk and mechanical, in the optimizing and 
satisficing styles. Decisionmakers focus to excess on the costs of getting this decision 
wrong, while overlooking the costs that a protracted process of decisionmaking itself 
                                                 
35  H.L.A. Hart, The Demystification of The Law, in ESSAYS ON BENTHAM 21 (1982) 
36  PETER H. SCHUCK, THE LIMITS OF LAW: ESSAY ON DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE (2000) 
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creates. “The neglect of the opportunity costs that are created by the fact that decision 
making takes time is . . . an important and pervasive source of irrationality.”37 
An ethical analogy, and the distorting force of particulars. An analogy to ethics is 
useful here. The choice between maximizing, on the one hand, and optimizing or 
satisficing on the other, has some of the same intellectual structure as the choice between 
rule-utilitarianism, which counsels that ethical subjects act in accordance with rules 
whose observance will maximize overall utility, and act-utilitarianism, which counsels 
ethical subjects directly to choose whichever action maximizes overall utility.38 The rule-
utilitarian acknowledges that the utility-maximizing rules may sometimes call for actions 
that, when viewed in isolation, are locally suboptimal from the utilitarian point of view. 
The rule-utilitarian, then, will sometimes be placed in the awkward position of defending 
acts whose immediate effect is, when viewed in isolation, socially detrimental. So too, it 
is the easiest thing in the world for maximizing interpreters to emphasize specific cases in 
which stopping rules produce interpretive blunders, relative to an all-things-considered 
approach that would (if applied by an infallible interpreter with infinite time to make 
decisions) have taken into account relevant information excluded by a stopping rule. 
A corollary is that second-order interpretive strategies suffer from the distorting 
force of particulars. Maximizers will always be able to point to lurid examples in which 
second-order strategies produce suboptimal results, even if second-order strategies are 
best from some overall perspective. Such examples pack a strong rhetorical punch, but 
the problem goes deeper than that. The vivid costs in particular cases may trigger 
cognitive failings in the audience that is to evaluate the competing decisionmaking 
strategies, causing them to overreact to specifics while ignoring the crucial question of 
overall justification. A crucial mechanism here is salience, a heuristic that causes 
decisionmakers to overweight the importance of vivid, concrete foreground information 
and to underweight the importance of abstract, aggregated background information.39 
                                                 
37  JON ELSTER, ALCHEMIES OF THE MIND: RATIONALITY AND THE EMOTIONS 291 n. 149 (1999) (emphasis 
in original). 
38  For a current metaethical treatment of this distinction, see BRAD HOOKER, IDEAL CODE, REAL WORLD: A 
CONSEQUENTALIST THEORY OF  MORALITY (2000). 
39 See SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 125-26, 178-80 (1993) 




 I conclude with some mixed notes of pessimism and optimism. If simpleminded 
local maximizing is intellectually untenable, it is also remarkably persistent in the theory 
and practice of legal interpretation, by virtue of the mechanisms discussed in Part IV. We 
can at least hope, however, to make interpreters and students of interpretation aware that 
the maximizing style is not inevitable, that it represents a particular choice among local 
decisionmaking strategies, and that local maximizing is by no means obviously desirable 
from the globally-maximizing perspective. This point is only preliminary, for it does 
nothing to indicate what interpretive strategies are actually best in various settings. The 
subsequent questions are empirical, and involve the institutional capacities of interpreters. 
But in a legal system that still respects the claims of maximizing interpretation, it is a 
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